The global career of the notion of “heritage” as one of the central figures of social imagination is undoubtedly an offshoot of the memory boom which Sharon Macdonald described in the context of postwar European identity formation processes (2013, p. 3). In a world of fluid modernity (Bauman 1994) the game of “heritage” allows the participants to drop anchor, look behind, and create an impression of control over the passage of time. The imprecision of the idea is simultaneously its strength and its weakness, as is shown on the one hand by the great interest being displayed in selected elements of cultural heritage, and on the other, by the unending disputes and controversies over what should be the object of heritization, who is entitled to control it and on what principles. Gregory J. Ashworth and John E. Tunbridge’s lapidary definition, which is readily used in Cultural Studies, only outwardly facilitates a precise demarcation of the concept. From the sentence “Heritage is the contemporary usage of the past and is consciously shaped from history, its survivals and memories, in response to current needs for it” (1999, p. 105) we do not learn anything about the objects of those activities. We do not know who exactly is occupied with “processing” the past, who defines the needs, and finally whose memories are subject to manipulation.

It would seem that the source of the above misunderstandings lie in the very term “heritage” itself, on account of its ambiguity and of being firmly rooted in common knowledge. In the case of the Polish language, the word was at first a legal term meaning an inheritance (dziedzictwo) from forebears (dziad) (Brückner 1921). At present, its semantic field encompasses a range of other signifiers, which function in the natural language as its synonyms, expanding the sphere of connotation. The collection of such synonyms also contains expressions such as legacy, tradition, and monument, and even, in the broad sense of the term, culture. Heritage is understood by those using the term subjectively to mean specific material and symbolic cultural resources, existing per se, which the community has inherited from preceding generations and with which it has an emotional relationship.

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1 This research was funded by the HERILIGION project “Heritagization of Religion and the Sacralization of Heritage in Contemporary Europe”, HERA.15.033. The project is financially supported by the HERA, NCN, AHRC, FCT, DASTI, NWO, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020 under grant agreement No. 649307. The project’s Polish section is based at the Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of History, Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
Interestingly, a similar attitude is adopted in specialized agendas and by experts, who are not only professionally engaged in so-called heritage management but also in producing knowledge on the subject. Theoretically conscious of the contractual status of heritage and its processual character, in the course of their work they often suspend their critical perspective in order to point authoritatively to resources worthy of being called heritage. They plan the activities that should be undertaken in regard to that heritage. Thus they enter the role of curators of social memory and attempt to shape it: for instance, by protecting cultural goods or managing heritage\(^2\). If they are well acquainted with the social environment in which they work – its values and needs – they can generally rely on its support. If their project collides with the environment, they will meet with indifference and sometimes even with opposition.

The whole world is currently encompassed by the institutionalized movement, initiated by UNESCO, to promote selected cultural resources, thus stimulating new modes of thinking about our own past. Specific objects, practices, and ideas with a certificate of “originality” or of being “from the past” become tools of identity representation and simultaneously a product with measurable economic value, as is very aptly conveyed by the title – *Ethnicity, Inc.* – of John and Jean Comaroff’s book analyzing the phenomenon (2009). The powerful social movement we are observing contemporarily, which is concentrated on the search for, construction, and management of both material and entirely intangible cultural phenomena described by the term “heritage,” seems much more effectively to answer difficult questions about the past than critical historiography, which is concentrated on an in-depth but distanced analysis of sources (Lowenthal 1998). In the heritage perspective, the past is not only teleologically linked with the present but is also written into a vision of the future, providing existential meaning to a community emotionally that identifies with that heritage (Kowalski 2014; Macdonald 2013). Although the range of objects, practices, and ideas dictated by the interests of the heritage perspective is selective, the picture of the past from which it is created makes it seem cohesive and attractive. This is equally important not only for the creators of the transmission but for its potential recipients, as the use of suitable discursive methods helps in neutralizing dilemmas and conflicts.

**Modeling Identity**

In the context of identity formation processes, treating the past as heritage has even more far-reaching effects. The imaginary nature of heritage makes it an effective tool for building and integrating a community, which in this manner creates an image of itself. In contrast to history, which is concentrated on the cumulation of knowledge and its continual verification, heritage is based primarily on an attitude of believing, of requiring group acceptance and loyalty. As David Lowenthal writes,

\(^2\) I intentionally refrain from mentioning any names here, because, considering the scale of the phenomenon, the list would have to be very long, or in a shorter version might seem tendentious.
History tells all who will listen what has happened and how things came to be as they are. Heritage passes on exclusive myths of origin and endurance, endowing us alone with prestige and purpose. It benefits us by being withheld from others. Sharing or even showing a legacy to outsiders vitiates its value and power (1998, p. 8).

The community’s recognition and embrace of the past as its own entails the necessity of addressing those fragments that from the viewpoint of critical historiography do not fit the postulated image. This kind of lack of continuity, of breakage, of historical imprecision in patrimonial narratives does not arouse unease or doubts of the community making use of those narratives, as the omissions are not accidental. Balancing between exclusion and appropriation, dislike and affirmation, heritage helps the community find existential meaning. Thanks to heritage’s ambivalent, paradoxical nature it is an unusually flexible and currently popular instrument of social identification, showing various social groups their place in the surrounding world. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to Krzysztof Kowalski’s commentary in his study, “On the Essence of European Heritage”.

The mythic nature of heritage is not expressed, however, in full in its apocalyptic teleologicality (for instance, an object of conflict), as it does not exhaust the entirety of its clearly dual potential in the sinister context. After all, on the one hand, heritage justifies destruction but on the other, it can adopt “foreign” goods and injuries and make them “our own”. The change of axiological perspective leads to the preservation of goods that had previously aroused no one’s interest. This produces a kind of promise for the valorization and protection of other goods than those that are exclusively “ours”. Heritage thus carries in itself both the seeds of conflict and kernels of hope that there might be a state in which “foreign” goods and “foreign” victims, victories, and successes could become “ours” (2014, p. 142).

Thanks to its ability to combine contradictions, heritage is becoming a valuable tool for historical policy and a subject of rivalry at various levels of power, beginning with small local communities and ending with large supranational institutions. The process that UNESCO sanctioned in the 1970s, by which specific institutions and groups of experts certified selected cultural phenomena as worthy of protection and preservation for humanity on account of their “exceptional universal value,” not only corresponded very well with the specific historical moment but also marked out an ambitious plan for the future. Sharon Macdonald discusses the prospective dimension of heritage in an interesting manner, referring to the concept of the “future as cultural horizon” and the “future as cultural fact” formulated by Arjun Appadurai (Appardurai 2013; Macdonald 2019). She calls attention to the potentially far-reaching effects that specific decisions and activities within the “heritage-design process” could have. The more the parties are aware of the transformative force of the processes in which they are engaged, the greater the responsibility they bear for the future; this concerns everyone, including those persons who, as experts, are engaged in studying and describing the phenomenon. “Nevertheless, from what we have seen so far,”

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3 Historical policy refers to “...the deliberate and conscious actions of the authorities, aiming to maintain in society a set vision of the past.” It also signifies a “dispute between various interest groups, trying to suggest, or more strongly, to ‘impose’ on society their vision of the past” (Stobiecki 2008, pp. 175–176).
writes Macdonald, “there is little doubt that heritage-making does often involve social side-lining and hierarchies of the heritageable” (Macdonald 2019). Each of the sides engaging in this kind of project, however much they may try to maintain “neutrality,” transform reality by their participation and lead to cultural change. In essence we are dealing with a new version, supplemented by the paradigm of self-reflexivity, of an old problem which has been widely discussed in anthropology and which Jerzy Szacki defined as “recreated tradition” (2011)⁴, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger called “invented tradition,” (1983) and Allan Hanson named “cultural invention” (1989). The prospective dimension of heritage policy and especially the hope that it can be transformed it into a peaceful platform for cooperation of varying social groups is well illustrated by the Warsaw Recommendation on Recovery and Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage, a document produced during the course of the conference “The Challenges of World Heritage Recovery, International Conference on Reconstruction” in 2018 (Biuletyn 2017–2018). One of the document’s subchapters, entitled “Communities” contains well-known formulations of Enlightenment ideology, such as social justice, free speech, universal rights, and equal access to cultural resources, which have been included in the new context of a global program for the protection of heritage, based on the principle of broad social participation.

Decisions on recovery and reconstruction should follow people-centered approaches and fully engage local communities and, where appropriate, indigenous peoples, as well as other relevant stakeholders. Recovery and reconstruction should enable people to connect to their heritage, identity and history. In reconstructing heritage, consideration should be given to social justice and property titles and a rights-based approach should be applied, which would ensure full participation in cultural life, freedom of expression and access to cultural heritage for all individuals and groups, including refugees and internally displaced people, where relevant (Warsaw Recommendations 2018, p. 3).

The combination in the said declaration of the “field of social experiences with the horizon of expectations,” as Bronisław Baczko wrote of the essence of utopian imagination, turns it into another version of the utopian idea as a perfect project of a social organization (1994, p. 91) freed from antagonisms, constructed on the basis of humanitarian principles, and promising universal peace and security. To guarantee that order a special legal order with an extensive network of institutions was to be created and led by the World Heritage Committee in the role of the Senate. In this perspective, heritage is not just a common good requiring protection, but becomes a superior value, which according to the creators of the project will effectively bond the citizens of Heritopia and constitute a basis for its harmonious existence in the future. Although since the announcement of the Convention on the Protection of World Cultural Heritage in 1972 the pattern of introducing cultural policy has become more flexible and, at least theoretically, the focus is on the subject identifying with it, so-called heritage management and the procedure for adjudication are still highly formalized and hierarchical (Macdonald 2019; Silverman 2016).

⁴ Jerzy Szacki formulated the idea of created tradition at the beginning of the 1970s, using the term to describe imagined elements of cultural heritage, which in reality had not earlier belonged to that heritage.
While democratic and conciliatory at the level of official discourse, in practice, heritage policy is entangled in a complicated network of institutional dependencies and hierarchies, within whose framework there is an unceasing rivalry for the right to cultural, social, and economic resources of value to their participants. The conflicts that appear are generally connected with differing and at the same time relatively stable memory figures (Kowalewski 2012, p. 99) which are rooted in the social imagination of competing groups. Thus, too, in a situation of memory conflict, actions arising from heritage agendas and aiming for an institutionalized resemanticization of the environment under the banner of reconstructing heritage (for instance, erecting statues, changing street names, organizing museum exhibitions) may meet with criticism from the social environment in whose name those agendas are theoretically operating (Morgan 2004). It is not solely economic interests – as the adherents of a class-based social theory proclaim – that are behind the disputes over heritage, its range, preservation strategies, and use practices. There are also fundamental questions about identity asked by *homo symbolicus*: about who we are, who our ancestors were, and what are the boundaries of our heritage.

**PALIMPSESTS AND HIERARCHIES**

In the context of reflections on heritage the metaphor of palimpsest seems particularly handy (Saryusz-Wolska 2011). Considering the semiotic complexity of space and linking it more clearly with the temporal dimension, the metaphor also draws attention to its processual nature, which is entwined with the dialectic of forgetting and recalling. David Harvey’s proposed view of the urban environment as a palimpsest, which is “[…] a series of layers constituted and constructed at different historical moments all superimposed upon each other” (1989, p. 22), seems to be especially useful in the case of a semiotic reading of the space of so-called historical cities because it allows for the reconstruction of the complicated imaginary structures connected with those areas. Such a view is actually very similar to the interpretation of urban space once proposed by Boris Uspenskij, who viewed the creation of cities’ histories as a process consisting in:

 [...] selecting events and giving them meaning […] from the viewpoint of the present to the degree that memory of them is still live in the collective consciousness. At the same time, the past organizes itself as a text read from the perspective of the present (1998, p. 27).

Looking at heritage through the prism of memory politics⁵ requires scholars of heritage studies to use emotionless research procedures, which can be academically

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⁵ Instead of referring to Aleida Assman’s memory typology, I suggest a return to Maurice Halbwachs’s still inspiring and by now classic theory of the social frames of memory, which give cohesion to our thinking. Events from the past are selected in regard to ongoing needs and arranged in new sequences. What is willfully forgotten, on the other hand, is what could divide groups and threaten the present state of social balance (1969).
verified. In the case of “anthropology at home,” a particular challenge is the require-
ment of self-reflexivity in order not to enter the ethically dubious role of a politi-
cally engaged specialist in social engineering. However, what happens when the
recovery of heritage's individual layers and reconstruction are done by the users of
the space themselves, who are variously connected with it by political, economic,
religious, and other ties. In such situation the palimpsest space begins to function
as a warehouse full of memory traces, which, drawn into the light of day and placed
in an appropriate configuration, present a version of the past in accordance with
the users’ wishes. The multilayer structure, being the “effect of both layering and
erasure, as well as renovation, retrieval, and rereading of what was formerly hidden by
successive layers of meaning” (Kowalski, p. 64), enables various memory commu-
hities to find themselves within its framework, even though they are often compet-
ing and not infrequently also in mutual conflict on account of different historical
experiences, varying worldviews, and divergent political interests. On entering social
circulation, the palimpsest transforms itself into heritage, which, as Kowalski writes,
“in always belonging to someone, has additional potential of opening itself to other
allegiances and other interpretations” (2014, p. 64). Treating the palimpsest space
of the town as heritage also brings essential practical consequences, because thanks
to its attractive form, this kind of playing with the past usually produces measurable
economic value. Thus its potential is often intensively used in marketing strategies
for post-mass tourism, which is oriented toward the needs of more exacting recipi-
ents, who in travelling to a location seek what is out of the ordinary, original, and
mysterious (Urry 2002).

It is important, especially in the case of cultural or historical tourism, that attrac-
tions in the heritage category should have a certificate of authenticity from a public
authority – a government institution, a cultural center, a museum outlet, a socio-
cultural organization, and so forth. On the market, however, what counts is not
only having the title of heritage but also occupying a specific place. A bureaucra-
tized, multilayer system of certification creates a hierarchical order in the shape
of a pyramid, at whose summit there are objects with the status of world heritage
and at the bottom, those of local heritage. Questions of who, what, and which list
depend in essence on arbitrary decisions of institutions which always speak in the
name of some social milieu managed by people with specific political views, raised
in a specific cultural environment, and representing a specific group of interests. If
we control people's memory, says Foucault, we control their political activity, espe-
cially their resistance and opposition (1975), thus it is very important for authorities
to be concerned with what is subject to remembering and what should be forgotten
(Hirszowicz, Neyman 2001).

Since noblesse oblige, the price for occupying a high place in the specific memory
ranking is the necessity of adapting to the restrictive rules instituted by the herit-
age policy managers, who refer to specific values and ideas. A formalized system of
certification strengthens the hierarchical order, becoming a form of symbolic vio-

ence (Bourdieu, Wacquant 2001, p. 162–163), capable of silencing voices offering
alternatives to the official narrative. At the same time, along with a higher position on the heritage list, diversity and multiplicity of meanings give way to emblematic representation. Here is how Tunbridge and Ashworth comment on the process:

A generic heritage is, at least, relatively free of dissonance and unlikely to provoke social fiction. The tourist-historic city, then, becomes a near universal icon, symbolizing just “old” or “traditional”, without reference to any particular age or local tradition. As such it evokes almost universal feelings of continuity, familiarity, well-being, or reliability. The tourist-historic city becomes a stage for the display of a placeless vernacularism. The local becomes globally accessible as all can experience it everywhere, anywhere, through the localism that is now divorced from locality. Similarly, localities can express themselves through universal rather than place- or time-specific symbols. This prospect may be viewed as a deplorable nightmare of sterile uniformity or a highly desirable conflict-free, all-accessible utopia (2004, p. 220).

The cumulation, in a relatively small space, of cultural resources supplied with a certificate of heritage on various levels (local, national, global) provides, on the one hand, the possibility of identification for various social groups, and on the other, a new hierarchy in the symbolic and social order. This is particularly visible in a situation where groups whose cultural resources do not fit in the canon defined by the certifying institution lay claim to the title of heritage. The difference in opinion as to the value of said resources reveals not only different political views, hidden prejudices, and ongoing conflicts over memory, but also different visions of the future. Those things that in the opinion of decision-makers are not worth preservation for future generations may turn out to be precisely what is worthy in the eyes of the inheritors. The “dissonant heritage” of which we are speaking here is based on the ideas of discrepancy and incongruity (Tunbridge, Ashworth 1996, p. 21), and in essence reveals the logical inconsistency and conventionality of the category of heritage itself, on which the policy is based. If the actions postulated by the authors of the term offer an opportunity for the social negotiation of meanings, such a policy in principle is not worrying. However, if the diverse voices of the inheritors are entirely ignored, it undermines the credibility of the heritage management institutions.

A good illustration of the above-mentioned tension that heritage policy can generate is the case of Kraków and its palimpsestic, semantically dense but also symbolically hierarchical space. The city, whose center was entered on the World Heritage List in 1978, has become a bustling laboratory (Niedźwiedź 2019) where various teams of government officials, cultural center or museum employees, and social activists conduct sometimes collaborative and sometimes entirely independent work processing selected elements of the past under the title of discovering and protecting the city’s material and intangible heritage. The model and point of reference for their activities, which currently encompass all areas, is the center, the Old Town, which stands at the
top of Kraków’s heritage summit and was recognized by UNESCO as a common good of global significance. Sanctioned by the National Heritage Institute in 1994, the Old Town is simultaneously a national Historical Monument\(^6\). Having a world heritage site within a country’s territory is ennobling but could simultaneously evoke a certain cognitive dissonance because from the logical standpoint it requires that heritage to be shared with the inhabitants of the whole globe. If the site is loaded with national symbolism and strongly rooted in national mythology, as is the case with Kraków, the question is even more complicated (Purchla 2018). In Cold War conditions, the city’s entry on the first UNESCO World Heritage List was a special kind of political gesture, meant primarily to symbolically confirm the city’s centuries-long participation in European culture, which in the subtext could mean identification with the “Western civilization”. Actually, the official justification of the decision used the term “Central Europe” and Kraków itself was presented in one sentence as a place where the culture and art of East and West met. Nevertheless, the detailed argument is in essence an apology for the urban culture of the Old Continent with its art, scholarship, trade, institutions of power, and Christian centers of worship. Inclusion of the Kazimierz historical quarter was supposed to be a reminder of the role of Jews in the development of Europe’s urban civilization. Here is a passage from the document:

The historic layout of Cracow, with Wawel and Kazimierz, is one of the most outstanding examples of European urban planning, characterized by the harmonious development and accumulation of elements representing all architectural styles from the early Romanesque phase up to Modernism. The importance of the city is evident in the urban layout, numerous churches and monasteries, monumental secular public buildings, the remains of the medieval city walls, as well as urban places and town houses designed and built by high-class architects and craftsmen. The value of the ensemble is determined by the extraordinary accumulation of monuments from various periods, preserved in their original form, with authentic fittings, which combine to create a uniform urban ensemble in which the tangible and intangible heritage is preserved and nurtured to the present day.

The dominant point of the urban ensemble, Wawel Hill, is the symbol of the crown, a necropolis documenting the dynastic and political links of medieval and modern Europe. Cracow, one of the largest administrative and commercial sites in Central Europe, was a centre of arts and crafts, a place where Eastern and Western culture and art met. The importance of Cracow as a cultural centre of European significance is reinforced by the existence of one of the oldest universities of international renown, the Jagiellonian University. The picture of the city’s cultural richness is supplemented by Jewish monuments of Cracow’s Kazimierz\(^7\).

The pan-European tone of the above text, without national references, makes Kraków into a genus purged of distinctive elements of representation, one that fits

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very well into the idea of antiquity, which is attractive to contemporary tourists. In the context of the heritage of historical cities, Tunbridge and Ashworth wrote that “They have all become near-ubiquitous non-place-bound codes conveying a generalized historicity, in Western-dominated cities at least” (2004, p. 220). The effect is even more visible when we compare it with another, seemingly very similar text, justifying the National Heritage Institute’s granting the title of Historical Monument to Kraków. In the social imagination of Poles, this certificate sanctioned Kraków’s specific cultural rank on the map of Europe while simultaneously confirming the national nature of its heritage. Introducing a more precise chronology of the kings of Poland and paying attention to the value of local art solidifies Kraków’s image and is supposed to emphasize its uniqueness. At the same time, a strategic role in passing from a pan-European to a national discourse is played here by a section describing the Wawel. From the perspective of national heritage policy, the castle and cathedral are no longer so much a testimony to European unity based on dynastic relationships and political alliances as above all a dominant symbol of the continuity of Polish statehood:

The dominant architectonic complex – the royal castle on the Wawel, the center of state power from the dawn of the Polish state, the headquarters of the majority of the ruling Polish dynasties, the necropolis of the kings of Poland [emphasis mine – M.G.C.] – is one of the largest of this type of defensive residential complexes joined with a city. On the Wawel, at the royal residence, the focus was on intellectual, cultural, and artistic life, leaving in succeeding epochs outstanding works of art, which have been preserved to this day.  

The dual status of national and global heritage means that the historical center of Kraków, which since at least the second half of the nineteenth century has been a destination for patriotic Polish pilgrims, is currently one of the most popular points on the tourist map of Europe. The title of “world heritage” has brought to the city measurable economic benefits and, as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Ashworth, Tunbridge 1999, p. 112), has contributed to supporting the restoration of the city’s historical fabric. Kraków has thus become a tourist attraction (MacCannel 1999). With the opening of the borders after 1989 it began to draw ever larger crowds of tourists and is currently one of the three most frequently visited places in Poland. As mentioned above, the processing of the past in terms of “heritage” today encompasses all of Kraków and is primarily an instrument of education policy, addressed to the inhabitants and especially to the youth, supported by local, as well as national and EU funding. However, there is a place within the city that clearly distinguishes itself by the scope of such activities and, moreover, that sometimes causes problems for the institutions controlling the “correct” course of the heritage-producing process. This place is the district of Nowa Huta, which lies in the eastern part of the city.

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9 The number of visitors to Kraków in 2018 was 13.5 million in total, of which 23% were foreign tourists. Since 2005, the number has increased almost twofold. See https://www.bip.krakow.pl/zalaczniki/dokumenty/n/234010/karta, by Krzysztof Borkowski, accessed 25.06.2019.
SOCIALIST NOWA HUTA: A HISTORICAL MONUMENT AND CULTURE PARK

From the viewpoint of the current, nationally oriented memory politics, Nowa Huta is above all the child of postwar Poland’s communist regime. This view of the district comes from the conviction that the construction of a gigantic metallurgical plant and town just beyond Kraków was intended to punish its inhabitants for their hostile stance toward the communist authorities, as shown by the results of the referendum in 1946 and parliamentary elections in 1947 (Purchla 1996). Prewar Kraków’s economy was based on trade and services lacking large industry, it also had the longest university tradition in Poland, numerous postwar migrants from landed estates and from cities that found themselves within the borders of the USSR after the borders were moved, and very strong presence of the Catholic Church. Nowa Huta indeed appeared to be a negative of that picture—an industrial workers’ monoculture, settled by migrants from the countryside, or in other words, a symbol of Stalinist industrialization, degrading the former capital of Poland. The prevalence of this view is shown by a statement of the chairman of the Social Committee for the Renovation of Kraków’s Historical Monuments, Franciszek Ziejka, to the Polish Press Agency on the 40th anniversary of Kraków’s entry on the World Heritage List:

The world has heard of the city, which in the postwar period, as a result of Polish People’s Republic propaganda, was supposed to be associated with Nowa Huta. Entry on the UNESCO list was a reminder to the European consciousness that Kraków is a pearl of world heritage. It was also a form of compensation to Poland’s former capital for its years of dramatic history10.

As the Nowa Huta plant was supposed to be the largest producer of steel in the country, its effective functioning involved the need to create appropriate residential facilities, capable of housing thousands of future employees and their families. Thus at the same time as the plant was being built, an entirely new settlement was begun on adjacent land and was planned to be a model modern socialist town. After two years, however, the authorities abandoned the idea and decided to include Nowa Huta within the administrative boundaries of Kraków as one of its districts. The emergence of the town and establishment of the gigantic steel plant led in a very short time to a radical transformation of the socio-cultural landscape of the entire vicinity and the creation of a kind of industrial monoculture. Under the pressure of the growing steel plant and the housing settlements, in villages, cultivated fields, orchards, and gardens

10 https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1354101%2Ckrakow-bedzie-obchodzil-40-rocznice-wpisania-na-liste-swiatowego-dziedzictwa-unesco.html, access date: 04.07.2019. The construction of the metallurgical plant in Nowa Huta was one of the most important investments of the Six Year Plan (1950–1955), the second in the postwar program to rebuild Poland based on a strategy of forced industrialization (Salwiński, Sibila et al. 2008). In the 1950s, 211,000 persons came to work at the plant, of which one third settled permanently (Siemierska 1969, p. 36). The steelworks continued to draw thousands of people well into the 1980s. The systemic transformation in 1989 brought radical change, which began with a program to restructure the plant and led to a drastic reduction in employment. The numbers employed in the steelworks were 38,674 in 1979; 29,288 in 1989; 8,686 in 2000, and around 3,500 in 2018. In 2005 the plant was bought by the concern Mitall Stell Poland S.A. (currently ArcelorMittal Poland S.A.). See https://poland.arcelormittal.com, accessed 20.05.2019.
began to disappear (Miezian 2002; Piasecki 1971). “The most wonderful lands” – as today the former owners remember with regret their lost farms – were almost entirely absorbed by the town (Gryczyński 2006; Gryczyński 2008). Such experience of loss of home and land by the local farmers, which constituted during the entire period of the Polish People’s Republic a “hidden transcript”¹¹, was transformed along with the liberation of social memory in 1989 into a “public transcript” (Scott 1990, p. 184), one more reminder of the trauma of the autochthonous population in connection with the building of the new town.

The first generation of workers employed in the plant was recruited largely from those engaged in its construction, which along with opening of succeeding production departments were retrained and became full-time employees. In terms of identity formation processes, the workers viewed the Nowa Huta plant and its vicinity as their home and belonging as it was built by their collective efforts. After the stage of construction in the 1950s, the period of real socialism arrived. The cyclical economic crises in Poland from the 1960s on, in connection with the totalitarian system of government, produced an ever greater disappointment with the system, which gradually gave rise to organized social resistance. In Nowa Huta, this process peaked in the 1980s, when strikes and massive street protests heightened the sense of community among the locals – this time based on the experience of collective rebellion against the authorities. Strong identification with the district is felt to this day not only among the above-mentioned inhabitants; it can also be noticed in the collective life being lived in the courtyards, in housing settlement clubs, and in various kinds of local social associations (Golonka-Cząjkowska 2013; Lebow 2013; Poźniak 2014).

The former construction workers today reminisce calmly about the difficulties connected with the first period of building and settling in Nowa Huta. They treat that period as a stage in their lives which was not easy but was by no means tragic, especially when they begin to compare it with the time of Second World War and the humble living standards in their native parts¹². One will not find bitterness, regret, or fear in their accounts. Instead, they speak of the enthusiasm, the hope for a quiet life, and of their stubborn striving to obtain their own small, private stabilization, which meant a roof over their head and steady work ensuring a quiet existence. Asked about social problems in the first years of living in the Nowa Huta, they most often mention alcoholism, whose source they see not so much in the “system”, that is, in the deliberate aim of the authorities, as in the ordinary human weakness of those who became addicted. At the same time, they note that in contrast to the present situation, in those days they felt safe in the streets.

They treat the time of construction as an integral part of their own history, the outcome of work by the thousands who came here. Memory of that time, entwined with

¹¹ A “hidden transcript” as James Scott writes, belongs to the discrete sphere of infrapolitics practiced by disenfranchised groups. It is their means of resistance against the authorities, a social sphere in which they can reveal, without fear, opinions, preferences, and aims that are different from those of the official narrative.

¹² On the basis of ethnographic research conducted by the author in the years 2012–2013 based on the method of autobiographical interviews among the first group of Nowa Huta settlers and plant workers.
the myth of a “time of selfless effort, authentic ardor and enthusiasm,” forms today the basis of their local identity (Golonka-Czajkowska 2013; Gut 1994). With pride, they point to the apartment blocks, the green squares and wide streets, which they raised in the middle of nowhere, among meadows and grain fields. In their memories, the proverbial Nowa Huta mud is not so much a depressing metaphor for the conditions of life during construction as a sign of the amorphous material from which they managed with impressive speed to create a comfortable and, to their minds, beautiful town.

Currently, a variety of memory groups act as representatives for the inhabitants of Nowa Huta. Each of them makes the district into a point of reference for their group identity and refers to the category of heritage, conceptualizing it in their own way. In some cases, heritage connotes material substance, defined according to a typical key of “ancientness” and thus testifying to the rich past of the land – a thirteenth-century Cistercian monastery, Gothic and Baroque churches, and nineteenth-century architecture. Objects connected with the beginnings of Nowa Huta in the strict sense are also viewed as belonging to that “ancientness”, that is, its heritage from the years 1949–1955, whose material traces are the first Nowa Huta settlement, the social realist construction of the town center and the plant. Evidence of the inhabitants’ resistance to the authorities in the years 1960–1988 is also considered heritage, especially of the first Nowa Huta church, The Lord’s Arc, built in the 1970s thanks to the overwhelming support of the inhabitants.

Events from recent past raise the emotional temperature of the narratives and the degree of engagement in the process of heritage reconstruction. The attitudes range from pride to embarrassment, affirmation to negation, depending on individual fates and political sympathies. The place of an impersonal “ancientness”, which requires identifying with an abstract imaginary community, is occupied by “recent” heritage, which is the register of the experiences of their own ancestors – near and distant relatives, neighbors, and work colleagues – a trans-generational memory preserved in language and embodied in daily practices and ritual situations (Baraniecka-Olszewska 2018; Connerton 2006). This approach to the events of their own district is well illustrated by a passage from a statement by a Nowa Huta social activist, Maciej Twarog, published in a local newspaper:

Nowa Huta is an intergenerational history. The history of people. The history of people who came here from various parts of the war-torn country – of Poland destroyed by war. They came in order to build houses for themselves and a great steelworks, which was supposed to be a guarantee that they would have work, that is, something those people had never had. In the case of my father, I can say, that this is how it was. Nowa Huta gave him everything. From learning how to read, write, and do sums through learning a good trade as a mason. And everything that they left behind – those successive generations of Nowa Huta settlers – it’s as if today it’s bursting. Those first inhabitants, on the other hand, had to get together, work together, become acquainted and become friends.

13 The Nowa Huta Heritage and Identity Workshop of the C.K. Norwid Nowa Huta Culture Center has been very active in this sphere, initiating a series of activities for both Nowa Huta inhabitants and for other people. The leaders of the Workshop also publish original guides to try to deconstruct stereotypes in regard to the district and to show its cultural richness (Kłaś 2017; Kłaś 2018; Kłaś, Wąchała-Skindzier 2019).

A strong identification with heritage of this kind, even though theoretically it fulfills the academic conditions necessary to be defined as such, at the level of social practice becomes a source of misunderstandings and problems for the higher level authorities, especially at the national level. For as long as the activities of local patriots can be qualified as belonging to the category of local heritage, they do not threaten the official historical policy of the authorities. However, if they have ambitions to rise above that level, they begin to create an image problem and – as in the case of socialist heritage – to seriously collide with the contemporarily popularized image of postwar Poland as a dark period of Soviet occupation, totalitarian subservience, economic downfall, and cultural decline.

The unsuccessful efforts of Nowa Huta society and council members to have the town's socialist realist center granted the status of world heritage is an example of this kind of divergence between a local imagining of heritage and the central authorities’ heritage policy. The first step toward having Nowa Huta's value recognized was the voivodeship conservation office's entry of the urban layout of the oldest part of the district in the register of historical monuments in 2004. In the official justification, the area was recognized as “a representative example of socialist realist urbanism in Poland”, which “on account of its urban, architectonic, and historical attributes has major value for the history and cultural landscape of Kraków, and in the context of Poland's history and European urbanism”. A few months later, the City Council decided to support efforts to have the oldest part of the district entered on the UNESCO list. Considering the negative image of the district that is rooted in the collective imagination of the inhabitants of the remaining parts of Kraków, and the simplification, hyperbolization, emotional, and unequivocal judgments that characterize many of the statements about Nowa Huta, such a declaration created an opportunity for the Nowa Huta inhabitants to improve the district's image in the minds of their fellow citizens and to shed their insecurities about being from a “worse” part of Kraków. At least officially, this is how the initiators of the campaign for the entry spoke on the subject, seeing in it simultaneously a chance for a better use of their district's tourist potential and its potential economic development. In 2013 the experts engaged in promoting the candidacy emphasized the objective value of the buildings. The Chairman of the Polish National Committee ICOMOS, Bogusław Szmygin, considered that “[it] represents a closed period in the development of architecture, of a supra-regional nature, which from the perspective of time already has a certain value”. At the time, another expert called attention to

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15 According to the provisions of Polish law, a historical monument is defined as “[...] real or moveable property, its parts or complexes, being the work of humans or of their activity and providing evidence of a past era or event, and whose preservation is in the social interest on account of historical, artistic, or scientific value” (Journal of Laws of July 23, 2013, section 1, art. 3).
17 Local city councilors, local culture centers, members of local cultural NGOs, and employees of the Nowa Huta division of the Historical Museum of the City of Kraków participated in the campaign.
the fact that its unique attributes should be a sufficient argument for awarding it the title of world heritage:

Nowa Huta has the potential to be entered on that list and it would be the second such place, along- side Brazil. Part of the list is devoted not only to historical monuments from several thousand years ago but also to cities that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, for instance, Oscar Niemeyer’s Brasilia. Nowa Huta fulfills all the requirements. It is the only place in Poland and one of not many in Europe to have a perfect urbanist grid. It was designed from A to Z. […] That is what we should protect. The manner of its planning, construction, and habitation, the material and intangible heritage of Nowa Huta and the urban architecture from the turn of the 1940s to the 1950s. This is the unique thing that cannot be found anywhere else19.

Nevertheless, the attempt to advance the old part of Nowa Huta in the “heritage hierarchy” ended in failure. A new idea in 2013 – for Poland to join Germany in a campaign to have social realist heritage entered on the list (the heritage in this case being Karl Marx Ale in Berlin)20 – was not acted upon and did not meet with approval from the central authorities. A representative of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage made the matter clear after a meeting of the Offices of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee when she claimed that the candidacy of Nowa Huta had not been officially announced and furthermore it was not being considered as a future historical monument. During this same interview, she declared, however, that Gdańsk Shipyard, as the birthplace of Solidarity, had a chance at such a nomination and the entry of that facility on the UNESCO list would be a “symbol of the fall of communism in East Central Europe”21. For the national-conservative authorities, a narrative about the end of socialism in Poland seemed much safer than a narrative about its beginnings.

SUMMARY

Heritage is in essence a discursive category, defined for the use of historical policy and supplied with a range of restrictive regulations. It is the product of a particular ideology and historical conditions. Portrayed as an objective entity, by means of persuasive rhetoric it can be used to evoke positive feelings and above all pride (a community’s collective state of self-satisfaction), or negative feelings – collective anger and sense of loss. It thus has the ability to integrate a community by imposing an appropriately configured social imaginary referring to the community’s history.


20 Berlin’s candidacy, which was promoted by Bürgerverein Hansaviertel e.V. with Corbusierhaus e.V. and the Hermann Henselmann Foundation, was confirmed by the Berlin Senate and in 2013 received the support of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 2014, however, it was rejected by the UNESCO International Advisory Board. https://hansaviertel.berlin/en/unesco/auf-dem-weg-zum-weltkulturerbe/, accessed 02.07.2019.

This process depends on extracting, reconfiguring, and exhibiting those elements of the past that are in accord with the ideological program of the present authorities. However, those elements which do not fit that ideological program, or are considered problematic or embarrassing, are simply eliminated as inappropriate from the viewpoint of state interests. At most, they might be supplied with the label of local heritage, which safely limits their reach.

The fate of Nowa Huta, in being considered an inappropriate candidate for entry on the World Heritage List, is a good illustration of the rules that govern the officially democratic heritage policy. Guarded by procedures and verifying institutions, a complicated network of dependencies and hierarchies makes the heritage that is of “unusual importance for humankind” to be in essence an export product of the historical policy of specific national governments. Thus, while the imagined European character of Kraków’s historical center was deemed useful for proving its belonging to the “civilized West”, the labeling of Nowa Huta as “Soviet”, “Eastern” or “barbarian” because of its socialist past, working-class profile and village roots, seems to produce a serious image problem for contemporary authorities (regardless of whether they are referring to liberal or national-conservative ideology). As in the case of the Święta Rękawki (Holy Sleeves) celebration, of which Kamila Baraniecka writes in the same volume of PE (2019), recognition of Nowa Huta could lead to the introduction of elements that do not accord with and that orientalize the postulated, occidental image of Poland’s former capital.

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In essence a discursive category, heritage is currently one of the most widespread tools for developing historical policy. Supplied with the “heritage” brand by appropriate institutions certifying objects and cultural practices, heritage serves as a canvas for the creation of attractive images of the past in specific places and communities. Thanks to its persuasive power, it can successfully model the collective imagination and influence identity processes. Guarded by procedures and verifying institutions, the special symbolic and economic value of heritage becomes an element of rivalry and a source of social conflicts. An illustration of such tension is Kraków’s palimpsestic and semantically dense space, which is ordered according to a strict symbolic hierarchy. Consideration of the different treatment of Kraków’s Old Town complex, which was entered on UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 1978, and the socialist realist centre of Nowa Huta, which unsuccessfully pretended to the title, reveals the hidden rules governing the supposedly democratic heritage policy.

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